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ROBERT S. CHANG* 
Centering the Immigrant in the 
Inter/National Imagination (Part III):† 
Aoki, Rawls, and Immigration 
ifteen years ago, Keith Aoki and I published “Centering the 
Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination” in an early LatCrit 
symposium.1  The core idea animating that article is encapsulated in 
its opening sentence: “How a nation treats the immigrant speaks 
volumes about the nation.”2  Our notion was that the immigrant, 
though invoked in phrases such as “We are a nation of immigrants,” 
was more typically placed at the periphery rather than the center.  We 
sought, in that article, to place the immigrant at the center of the 
analysis.3  We thought we were at a critical juncture with regard to 
U.S immigration law and policy, and we felt there was a great need 
for a critical examination of the “project of national self-definition.     
. . . [which] includes not only deciding whom to admit and expel, but 
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also providing for each alien’s transition from outsider to citizen.”4  
We found it odd that “borders [had] become increasingly porous to 
flows of information and capital” but were “constricting when it 
[came] to the movement of certain persons.”5  Our article was an 
attempt to draw attention to this phenomenon and to examine the 
ways that immigrant identities, immigrant communities, and the 
nation are constituted. 
Joined by Ibrahim Gassama, we recognized that these questions 
were too large for a single article, and so we followed it up quickly 
with a symposium that further addressed these questions, Citizenship 
and Its Discontents, published in the Oregon Law Review.6  This 
symposium spanned two issues of the Review and included 
contributions by Neil Gotanda,7 Natsu Saito,8 Kevin Johnson,9 Enid 
Trucios-Haynes,10 Victor Romero,11 Anthony Farley,12 Dennis 
Greene,13 Hope Lewis,14 Tayyab Mahmud,15 Kunal Parker,16 Tanya 
Hernández,17 and Maggie Chon.18  In the Foreword to the symposium 
we noted, 
 
4 Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1944–45 (1996). 
5 Chang & Aoki, supra note †, at 1398. 
6 The symposium was published in volume 76 of the Oregon Law Review. 
7 Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community Among “We 
the People”: A Review Essay on Citizenship Without Consent, 76 OR. L. REV. 233 (1997). 
8 Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and 
Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997). 
9 Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as “Foreigners,” 
and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347 (1997). 
10 Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Legacy of Racially Restrictive Immigration Laws and 
Policies and the Construction of the American National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369 
(1997). 
11 Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection 
Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 
OR. L. REV. 425 (1997). 
12 Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457 (1997). 
13 Frederick Dennis Greene, Immigrants in Chains: Afrophobia in American Legal 
History—The Harlem Debates Part 3, 76 OR. L. REV. 537 (1997). 
14 Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of Inter/national 
Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REV. 567 (1997). 
15 Tayyab Mahmud, Migration, Identity, & the Colonial Encounter, 76 OR. L. REV. 633 
(1997). 
16 Kunal M. Parker, Official Imaginations: Globalization, Difference, and State-
Sponsored Immigration Discourses, 76 OR. L. REV. 691 (1997). 
17 Tanya Katerí Hernández, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure 
of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997). 
18 Margaret Chon, Acting Upon Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics 
by Lisa Lowe, 76 OR. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
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 The symposium participants address three overlapping clusters 
of issues and ideas: (1) the interaction of citizenship, immigration, 
and race from a U.S. vantage point; (2) a reframing of race, slavery, 
and the colonial encounter both inside and outside of the U.S. 
context; and (3) the interrelationship of transnational flows of 
capital and information and the increasing flow of persons across 
national boundaries. 
 At the close of the twentieth century, increasing migrations of 
persons are straining traditional concepts of the imagined 
community of the nation-state as well as the imagined community 
among nation-states.  Each piece in this Symposium attempts to 
center the immigrant by examining individual and group agency 
within these changing communities.19 
An important part of our analysis then was to explore the way that 
the nation, following the end of the Cold War, underwent an identity 
crisis: “Without its ideological Other, against which it had defined 
itself, what role was the United States to take in the world?”20  Our 
hypothesis was that the anxiety engendered by this national identity 
crisis was being managed through the renewed and reinvigorated 
attention paid to the enemy within—immigrants whose bodies were 
marked by difference—and the struggle over language, 
multiculturalism, and immigration.21 
My sense is that the issues and controversies that raged during this 
time were managed, but not resolved, as our nation entered into a 
period of relative economic prosperity.  But perhaps more 
importantly, the more general anxiety over immigration became 
displaced by the so-called “War on Terror.”  I would suggest that with 
the killing of Osama Bin Laden and the planned departure of our 
primary military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, attention has 
refocused on the “enemy within,” undocumented immigrants, and the 
“enemy without,” those who lurk outside our borders seeking to 
invade and overcome. 
Fifteen years after “Centering the Immigrant,” we find ourselves 
wrestling with the same questions.  We find our nation at another key 
juncture with regard to the issue of immigration, the rights of 
immigrants, and what is to be our national self-conception.  Instead of 
books like Arthur M. Schlesinger’s The Disuniting of America: 
 
19 Gassama et al., supra note †, at 209. 
20 Chang & Aoki, supra note †, at 1406. 
21 Id. at 1407–08; see also ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, 
LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 13 (1999). 
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Reflections on a Multicultural Society22 or Peter Brimelow’s Alien 
Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster23 
from the 1990s, we have Patrick Buchanan’s State of Emergency: The 
Third World Invasion and the Conquest of America24 and J.D. 
Hayworth’s Whatever It Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security, 
and the War on Terror.25  Instead of Proposition 187 in California, 
we have Arizona’s SB 107026 and similar laws in Utah,27 Indiana,28 
South Carolina,29 Georgia,30 and Alabama.31 
One of the things that Keith and I talked about fifteen years ago 
was the role that political theory might play in helping to think 
through what appeared to be an intractable political problem.  He 
suggested that I apply our methodology of centering the immigrant to 
political theory.  We had several conversations about social contract 
theory and how that would apply to immigrants.  I started an article, 
and though Keith encouraged me to complete it, I never did. 
I will use the occasion of this Symposium to revisit those 
conversations with Keith about centering the immigrant in political 
theory.32  What follows is a sketch that shows how centering the 
 
22 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992). 
23 PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995). 
24 PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD INVASION AND 
CONQUEST OF AMERICA (2006). 
25 J.D. HAYWORTH, WHATEVER IT TAKES: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, BORDER 
SECURITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). 
26 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), modified, H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  Part of SB 1070 is now codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-
1051(B) (LexisNexis 2012). 
27 Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Adv. Legis. Serv. 21 (LexisNexis) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. titles 76, 77), amended by Act of 
Mar. 15, 2011, 2011 Utah Adv. Legis. Serv 18 (LexisNexis). 
28 Act of May 10, 2011, 2011 Ind. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 171 (LexisNexis) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of IND. CODE titles 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 34, & 35). 
29 S.B. 20, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011). 
30 Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011-252 Ga. Code Ann. 
Adv. Legis. Serv. 252 (LexisNexis) (to be codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. 
titles 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, & 50). 
31 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. 535 (LexisNexis). 
32 Keith, in the year before his passing, had returned to the question of centering the 
immigrant in two pieces.  See Keith Aoki, The Yellow Pacific: Transnational Identities, 
Diasporic Racialization, and the Myth(s) of the “Asian Century,” 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
897 (2011); Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: 
Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and 
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immigrant exposes the inattention paid to the immigrant and the issue 
of immigration in social contract theory.  It focuses on how the 
immigrant might be brought into the conversation within John 
Rawls’s notion of the original position and the veil of ignorance.33  
This Essay does not seek to determine the content of the conversation 
nor what principles might be agreed upon by those in the original 
position. 
* * * 
Persons of Asian descent have been heavily impacted by legislation 
affecting immigration.  I use “persons of Asian descent” here to 
remind us that laws affecting immigration by their very nature affect 
persons and communities on both sides of the border.  The strong 
impact of immigration laws in shaping communities has prompted 
one commentator to state that Asian America has been made and 
remade through immigration policy.34 
Examination of the historical reveals the often not-so-hidden 
prejudices of lawmakers in enacting legislation that would have a 
very strong impact on persons of Asian descent.35  While this 
historical inquiry is crucial in helping us to remain vigilant against a 
resurgence of what I have called “nativistic racism” directed against 
Asians and other immigrants of color, my project is a slightly 
different one.  My question is one regarding theory.  What is the 
political theory that will support a coherent theory of immigration law 
given the exclusion in the past of Asian Americans from full political 
participation?36  I pay particular attention to social contract theory 
because in some ways, voluntary immigrants present or permit the 
 
Considering Whether “Immigration Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2010). 
33 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). 
34 See BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850–1990 (1993). 
35 See, e.g., id.; HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790–
1990 (1994); ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 
1882–1943 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991). 
36 Keith Aoki, A Tale of Three Cities: Thoughts on Asian American Electoral and 
Political Power After 2000, 8 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2002); Keith Aoki, Direct 
Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government Law, and Residential Racial 
Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 
185 (1997); Keith Aoki & Robert S. Chang, Half-Full, Half-Empty? Asian American 
Electoral “Presence” in 2008, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 565 (2009); Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki 
& Bryan Ikegami, Voting Matters: APIAs, Latina/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in 
California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849 (2002). 
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strongest case for the application of social contract theory because it 
can be said that they have placed themselves voluntarily under the 
sovereign authority of their new country.  Yet social contract theory 
appears to have a blind spot when it comes to immigration or the 
movement of peoples between sovereign nation-states.  This Essay 
offers a diagnosis of a problem—the present incoherence of 
immigration law and policy—and suggests that political theory might 
offer a useful way to think through these issues. 
Before I proceed further, I should probably confess that I am an 
immigrant.  I say this in part to problematize my enterprise.  Can I, as 
a naturalized citizen, contribute meaningfully to the discussion of 
immigration in a way that is somehow not tainted by my perspective?  
Elsewhere, I have discussed the importance of perspective, that 
everyone exists within and speaks from a context.  Thus, my thoughts 
about immigration are affected by the fact that I was once an alien; 
but this does not mean that the thoughts of a native-born citizen who 
writes about immigration are objective or unaffected by her 
perspective.  They are colored—differently, perhaps, but colored all 
the same.  So rather than cloak what I am about to say in a false 
notion of objectivity, I will reveal my perspective from the outset. 
* * * 
“This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice.” 
Kant once commented on this common saying, “This may be true 
in theory, but it does not apply in practice,”37 and every theoretician 
encounters this concern in some form during her work.38  For myself, 
the relevance of political theory in the context of immigration law39 
comes from my beginning premise—that immigration law in this 
country is in shambles.40  The following example, though a little 
dated, highlights some of the problems: 
 
37 IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does 
Not Apply in Practice,’ in POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 61 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet 
trans., 2d ed. 1991). 
38 I do not mean to embroil myself in the praxis/theory debate.  I hold to the view that 
engaging in theory is its own (separate) practice.  See generally Stanley Fish, Dennis 
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987). 
39 I am using immigration in an expansive manner to encompass not just entry into the 
country but rights once within this country, including, but not limited to rights regarding 
deportation.  This would then also include rights regarding status such as work 
authorization, legal permanent residence, and naturalization. 
40 For the purpose of this Essay, I will not set about proving this premise; others have 
done so in a more able fashion.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United 
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 Maria and Carlos are wife and husband.  Carlos, a citizen of 
Cuba, has lived in the United States for twenty-five years as a 
permanent resident alien.  Maria, a Colombian national, currently 
resides in Peru, although she would like to join her husband in the 
United States.  Carlos desires to bring his illegitimate daughter, 
Juanita, from Cuba to the United States. 
 . . . [S]hould the lawmakers conclude that noncitizen Hispanics 
are no longer desirable residents, Carlos could face expulsion.  He 
could also face deportation for his membership in any political 
party, if Congress were to make membership a deportable offense.  
Should Maria attempt to immigrate to the United States, she could 
be denied entry without any explanation or hearing . . . .  She can 
then be imprisoned in this country indefinitely, “pending 
deportation.”  United States government agents can search Maria’s 
home in Peru without probable cause or a warrant.  Those agents 
could also kidnap Maria and bring her to the United States to face 
criminal charges.  Juanita can be constitutionally denied the 
opportunity to reunite with her father in the United States solely on 
the basis of gender and illegitimacy.41 
It is not governed by reasoned principles, and as a result, justice is 
not even being approximated, let alone served. 
Additional evidence of the incoherence of immigration law can be 
seen through the example of Chinese and Haitian asylum seekers.  
Under the first Bush administration, generally, all that was needed for 
asylum rights to be granted to Chinese asylum seekers was a claim 
that they were fleeing the harsh population control policies of 
mainland China.42  While one might agree that this should serve as a 
basis for granting asylum rights, it is not clear that this policy was 
based on humanitarian concerns but rather on the Bush 
administration’s pro-life stance.43  With the changing of the guard, we 
saw that the Clinton administration, without a pro-life agenda, 
decided that fear of forced sterilization was not a basis on which to 
gain asylum rights.44 
 
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
853 (1987); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. 
REV. 965; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1984). 
41 Scaperlanda, supra note 40, at 967–69 (footnotes omitted). 
42 See Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United 
States, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 784 (1993). 
43 Id. 
44 Cf. Wesley L. Hsu, Comment, The Tragedy of the Golden Venture: Politics Trumps 
the Administrative Procedures Act and the Rule of Law, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 317, 355 
(1996). 
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Another example of the incoherence of immigration policy comes 
from the treatment of Haitian asylum seekers in comparison to Cuban 
asylum seekers.45  Joyce Hughes and Linda Crane note, “The 
prevailing norm . . . to provide protection to refugees from countries 
that are hostile to the United States, but to deny similar protection to 
‘equally worthy refugees from friendly countries.’”46  One result is 
asylum seekers from Cuba are favored in comparison to those from 
Haiti: “Haitians are often denied refugee status because Haitian 
regimes have historically been anti-communist and staunchly 
supportive of the United States’ attempts to end communist rule in 
Cuba.”47  This is the case “[d]espite the fact that it is widely known 
that the Haitian government practices systematic and pervasive 
oppression of political opposition.”48  My point here is to ask if any 
sense can be made of immigration law with an eye toward reform. 
There are of course many different ways to view immigration law.  
For example, one could see it as a purely political arena in which 
immigration law is determined solely by political forces or 
motivations.  Thus immigration law might be thought to serve the 
political ends required by our foreign policy.  Under this view, 
“progress” from the perspective of immigrant-rights advocates might 
come about when the interests of immigrants converged with those of 
the citizenry (or by proxy, those representing the citizenry).49  In a 
different context, Professor Mary Dudziak developed Derrick Bell’s 
interest-convergence hypothesis by placing the move toward 
desegregation in broader historical context and showed how Brown v. 
Board of Education served U.S. foreign policy interests.50  An 
historical examination of immigration law reveals that it has served 
U.S. foreign policy interests in a more naked fashion.  An obvious 
example comes during World War II when Japan played the race card 
in trying to elicit aid and sympathy from other Asian countries by 
 
45 See Hughes & Crane, supra note 42, at 763. 
46 Id. (quoting Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
865, 872 (1982)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (suggesting that the consensus against school 
segregation when Brown was decided resulted from the convergence of interests of whites 
and blacks).  That interest convergence might motivate change in the context of 
immigration is not a new idea.  See David Resnick, John Locke and the Problem of 
Naturalization, 49 REV. POL. 368, 381 (1987). 
50 Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 
(1988). 
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describing the unequal treatment that persons of Asian descent 
received in the United States.  Ronald Takaki recounts, 
Japan had been appealing to Asia to unite in a race war against 
white America.  Japanese propaganda had been condemning the 
United States for its discriminatory laws and for the segregation of 
the Chinese in ghettos where they had been relegated to “the most 
menial of occupations, despised and mistreated and at best 
patronizingly tolerated with a contemptuous humor.”51 
Japan tried to re-characterize the war as white versus yellow.52  The 
United States, in response, hastily adopted a new law in 1943 
permitting the naturalization of persons from China.53 
Although it is rational to limit immigration law to serve necessary 
foreign policy interests, it need not be limited in this fashion.  Nor 
should it be.  Earlier, I said that there did not seem to be reasoned 
principles guiding or underlying immigration law.  If you agree that is 
a problem, the question becomes this: what reasoned principles 
should inform immigration law? 
The first temptation is to consult the U.S. Constitution.  
Unfortunately, that document has little to tell us regarding 
immigration.  One result has been that the judiciary has generally 
abdicated its responsibility by refusing to oversee most disputes 
regarding immigration matters, leaving the matter largely in the hands 
of the other branches of government.  This idea of plenary power in 
the context of immigration begins with the Chinese Exclusion Case.54  
The Court held that if Congress “considers the presence of foreigners 
of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security . . . its determination is 
conclusive upon the judiciary.”55  Over the next few years, the Court 
clarified its position, essentially holding “that the political branches 
 
51 RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN 
AMERICANS 377 (1989); see also Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion, in 
ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309 (Hyung-chan Kim 
ed., 1996); John Hayakawa Torok, “Interest Convergence” and the Liberalization of 
Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asians, 1943–1965, in 
CHINESE AMERICA: HISTORY & PERSPECTIVES 1 (Marlon K. Hom et al. eds., 1995). 
52 TAKAKI, supra note 51, at 378 (quoting a Congressman as saying, “The Japanese 
have been carrying on a propaganda campaign seeking to align the entire oriental world 
behind Japanese leadership, seeking to set the oriental world against the occidental 
world.”). 
53 See id. 
54 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
55 Id. at 606. 
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could regulate immigration, immune from judicial review unless 
provided for by Congress.”56 
The plenary power doctrine has been heavily criticized.57  
Professor Motomura comments, “Critics expressed deep concern over 
the continuing isolation of an entire body of law from the mainstream 
of American public law—isolation not only from the process of 
constitutional judicial review, but also from the constitutional norms 
and principles developed through that process over the years.”58  
Motomura then addresses this problem through the idea of what he 
calls “phantom constitutional norms” that have been sneaking their 
way into some immigration decisions.  He argues that these phantom 
norms should be openly acknowledged and that constitutional norms 
that exist in other bodies of law should also apply generally to 
immigration.59 
Although I find this approach to reforming immigration law 
persuasive, my approach to this problem is different and is in some 
ways more expansive.  In searching for reasoned principles to inform 
immigration law, I focus on more basic questions in the arena of 
political theory about what it means to be a nation-state, how our 
conception of the nation-state affects our attitude toward the 
movement of persons between nation-states, and how the fortuity of 
birthplace should affect such things as a person’s right/privilege60 in 
deciding to which nation-state she belongs.  These questions which 
explore the intersection of law and political theory are not new, but as 
we can see from the ongoing debate surrounding immigration, no 
 
56 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 552–53 (1990) 
(discussing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) and Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).  The source of this notion of plenary power over 
immigration is unclear.  As indicated above, the Constitution says little about immigration.  
It mentions the word “citizen” eleven times, but never in the context of immigration.  The 
only oblique reference to immigration is a provision authorizing Congress to “establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
57 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 40; Motomura, supra note 56; Scaperlanda, supra note 
40.  A more recent critique highlights the way that the plenary power doctrine was 
fashioned to deal with Asian immigrants, American Indians, and the colonies it acquired 
following the Spanish-American War.  See Saito, supra note 8. 
58 Motomura, supra note 56, at 547. 
59 See id. at 549. 
60 I am using right/privilege in a Hohfeldian sense.  See generally Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
CHANG 7/24/2012  1:02 PM 
2012] Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination (Part III): 1329 
Aoki, Rawls, and Immigration 
satisfactory solutions have surfaced.61  Hence my questions.  But 
perhaps the real question is whether political theory has anything 
useful to say about this matter. 
One immediate barrier to my inquiry is the general lack of attention 
given by political philosophers to immigration or the movement of 
persons between nation-states.62  This silence does not mean that the 
work of those political philosophers is useless.  Instead, we are left 
with the unenviable task of trying to deduce from their political 
theory what they would say if they did talk about immigration.  I 
analogize the task as akin to when a federal district court has to 
decide what a state supreme court would say regarding a state-law 
matter when the state court has said nothing. 
This methodology is not new.  For example, Susan Moller Okin 
observed a similar silence of John Rawls with regard to gender and 
family issues;63 she then went on to fill the gaps using his theory of 
justice in her own work.64  My mission is to do a similar thing with 
regard to immigration that tries to carry forward the inquiry that Keith 
and I asked in our first coauthored piece—what would it mean if we 
centered the immigrant in the way that we conceive of the nation-
state—and what we carried forward the following year in the Oregon 
Law Review symposium entitled Citizenship and Its Discontents.65 
Around the time when Keith, Ibrahim, and I were thinking about 
these questions, two commentators noted the “explosion of interest in 
the concept of citizenship among political theorists.”66  They provide 
a number of reasons for this renewed interest in citizenship: 
At the level of theory, it is a natural evolution in political discourse 
because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands 
of justice and community membership—the central concepts of 
 
61 See generally Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 341, 357–76 (2008). 
62 For example, one commentator points out that among mainstream liberal political 
theorists, “[n]either Robert Nozick, John Rawls, nor Ronald Dworkin has raised the issue 
of the rights of aliens” and that “Bruce Ackerman is probably the most influential of those 
who have examined the transnational aspects of liberalism.”  Donald Galloway, 
Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration, 18 QUEEN’S L.J. 266, 269 n.4 (1993). 
63 See generally RAWLS, supra note 33. 
64 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989). 
65 Gassama et al., supra note †. 
66 Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on 
Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 352 (1994).  They note that in the late 1970s, the 
concept of citizenship was out of fashion, but that now, citizenship has become the “buzz 
word.”  Id. 
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political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively.  
Citizenship is intimately linked to ideas of individual entitlement on 
the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the 
other.67 
From this, we see that citizenship provides an important point of 
intersection between the competing interests of liberalism’s 
autonomous individuated self and communitarianism’s community.68  
Civic republicanism enters the conversation through “two different 
concepts [of citizenship] which are sometimes conflated in these 
discussions: citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, as full membership in 
a particular political community; and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, 
where the extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s 
participation in that community.”69  While the latter’s conception 
seems to embody the civic republican line, they do not have a 
monopoly on civic virtue.  Indeed, “some of the most interesting work 
on the importance of civic virtue is in fact being done by liberals such 
as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston.”70 
One major difference between the two conceptions of citizenship is 
in their treatment of persons as objects or subjects.  The trend seems 
to be toward treating persons as subjects with regard to citizenship 
matters.71  Given this trend, what is the effect on immigration, which 
for the most part seems status-driven?  And as a corollary, how does 
an object (immigrant) become a subject (citizen)?  What 
transformative process occurs?  If there is none, then it should provide 
one point on which to push immigration.  Perhaps immigration, as 
status-driven, is not reconcilable with a citizenship theory that is 
activity-driven. 
 
67 Id. They also note, 
Interest in citizenship has also been sparked by a number of recent political 
events and trends throughout the world—increasing voter apathy and long-term 
welfare dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nationalist 
movements in Eastern Europe, the stresses created by an increasingly 
multicultural and multiracial population in Western Europe, the backlash against 
the welfare state in Thatcher’s England, the failure of environmental policies that 
rely on voluntary citizen cooperation, and so forth. 
Id. 
68 One task then that Kymlicka and Norman set out to do is to “help clarify what is 
really at stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians.”  Id. 
69 Id. at 353. 
70 Id. at 365. 
71 Id. at 368 (“There is increasing support, however, from all points of the political 
spectrum, for the view that citizenship must play an independent normative role in any 
plausible political theory and that the promotion of responsible citizenship is an urgent aim 
of public policy.”). 
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In the next Part, I turn to how the issue of immigration might be 
addressed within social contract theory.  The primary tool I want to 
use is Rawls’s idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance.  
One thing to keep in mind about this enterprise is that the end product 
will not be decisions as to what immigration quotas should be.  
Rawls, early in A Theory of Justice, says, “In order to do this we are 
not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society 
or to set up a particular form of government.  Rather, the guiding idea 
is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the 
object of the original agreement.”72  In the next paragraph, he says 
that “those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one 
joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and 
to determine the division of social benefits.”73  So in the context of 
immigration, the idea is to set out reasoned principles from which 
such decisions can be made. 
It seems that the problem with any social contract theory lies in its 
concept of the original position.  Most social contract theorists 
operate from the premise that if a social contract were “signed onto” 
by real persons through agreement, that it would be tainted by their 
illegitimate self-interests.74  Rawls’s innovation was the introduction 
of the veil of ignorance to the original position.  Persons participating 
would step behind the veil of ignorance and would then be unaware of 
their position in life; this would then prevent them from acting in a 
self-interested fashion.75 
In applying the idea of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance with regard to immigration matters, some of the relevant 
positions in life are the following: 
 
72 RAWLS, supra note 33, at 10. 
73 Id. 
74 David Gautier’s social contract theory is a notable exception.  See DAVID GAUTHIER, 
MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING: CONTRACT, 
ETHICS, AND REASON (1990).  Gauthier differs from Rawls in that he “avoid[s] injecting 
moral premisses into his conception of rationality, as writers in the Kantian tradition might 
be said to do, and as Rawls does when he requires that principles of justice are to be 
agreed by ‘contracting parties’ who do not know their own identities or interests.”  Robert 
Sugden, The Contractarian Enterprise, in RATIONALITY, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 1, 2 (David Gauthier & Robert Sugden eds., 1993).  Instead, “[Gauthier] 
claims to derive moral principles from a theory of rational choice in which each individual 
pursues his or her own interests.”  Id. 
75 Rawls’s notion of the original position and the veil of ignorance is not without its 
critics.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 
1998). 
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1. Native-born citizen, 
2. Naturalized citizen, 
3. Statutory citizen, 
4. Permanent resident alien (those who have not yet met the 
minimum residency requirement for naturalization), 
5. Those who have met minimum residency requirements but 
either (a) have not filed for naturalization but plan to, or (b) 
have consciously decided not to file, 
6. Transients (this could also be subdivided), 
7. Undocumented persons, and 
8. Pre-immigrants. 
 
Of these groups, the pre-immigrants are those persons outside our 
borders who potentially would enter the nation-state given the 
opportunity.  The other groups would presumably be represented in 
the original position not in a literal sense, but in the sense that those 
operating behind the veil of ignorance would know that those are the 
groups of which they could potentially be members.  Presumably, pre-
immigrants would not be “represented” because a party to the original 
position could not imagine an outcome where that party would be 
outside the borders—that is, not a party to the original position. 
What would the parties to the original position agree to with regard 
to immigration matters?  What principles would they put into place 
for the resolution of disputes or for the setting of policy?  Where does 
power reside, and what constraints ought there to be on the exercise 
of power? 
With regard to immigration, the plenary power doctrine places 
unchecked power in the hands of the legislature.  Though legislators 
are subject to the democratic process, the plenary power doctrine 
insulates the bulk of their decisions regarding immigration matters 
from judicial review.  Even though pre-immigrants might not be part 
of the conversation in setting forth baseline principles, those behind 
the veil of ignorance would have to consider the possibility that they 
might have family and friends who seek entry into the country, or that 
they might be immigrants, legal or not.  Operating with perfect 
knowledge of the way that the plenary power doctrine has operated to 
insulate from judicial review decisions that have discriminated based 
on race, ethnicity, and national origin, those in the original position 
would reject the plenary power doctrine. 
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CODA76 
As this is a Symposium remembering Keith Aoki, I will close on a 
personal note.  I had the opportunity to introduce Keith as the 
recipient of the Society of American Law Teachers Great Teacher 
Award. 
In some ways, it’s easy to list his accomplishments.  He was a 
brilliant, prolific scholar. 
He wrote about the urban planning and how our policies shape the 
construction of race and space;77 he wrote about intellectual property, 
exploring and critiquing western notions of originary romantic 
authorship that become inscribed upon the entire world through 
intellectual property regimes that know no borders;78 he wrote further 
about the operation of law and borders and how it constructs and 
contains immigrant identity and immigrant communities; more 
recently he extended this work to explore the rise of regionalism in 
U.S. immigration politics and practice as it has played out in Arizona.  
He wrote a book about bio-piracy, where agrochemical companies 
would take the plant genetic resources from indigenous cultures, map 
their DNA, modify them slightly, and claim ownership over the 
seed’s genetic code.  The modifications were sometimes of the sort 
that were particularly well-suited to work with that company’s 
pesticides, or included a technology protection system dubbed the 
Terminator that would produce only one crop that would have sterile 
seeds, necessitating the purchase of new seeds every year, creating 
insidious dependence where previously farmers would have been able 
to share seeds from the previous crop to grow the next year’s.  He 
wrote about minority group electoral politics.  He wrote about the 
Alien Land Laws.  He made major contributions that deepened our 
knowledge of the operation of power in its multifarious forms.  This 
brief description doesn’t even begin to do justice to the scope and 
depth of Keith’s work. 
 
76 This Part incorporates much of what I intended to say during the University of 
Oregon’s commemorative event honoring Keith in the fall of 2011.  Unable to attend that 
event, I subsequently incorporated these remarks for the Society of American Law 
Teachers annual dinner in Washington, D.C., in January 2012 to introduce Keith as the 
recipient of SALT’s Great Teacher Award. 
77 Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, 
Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 
(1993). 
78 Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
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In addition to being an amazing scholar, Keith was a mentor to so 
many of us—both peer to peer and to junior folks.  There are so many 
in this room who can tell stories about how Keith helped them in 
some way. 
He was somebody who, instead of taking up room, created space 
for others.  He did this by organizing conferences and organizing 
symposia.  I remember the fights he had with the Oregon Law Review 
to ensure the publication of massive issues running several hundred 
pages because he wanted to make sure that the work of junior scholars 
was included.  For many of us, getting published in a mainline journal 
helped us get tenure in our institutions. 
He was an institution builder—to name just a few—CAPALF—the 
Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty; LatCrit; Western 
Law Teachers of Color.  He worked hard to organize and build these 
virtual spaces because he knew how vital they were to preserve our 
souls as most of us toiled in majority white institutions and 
encountered on a daily basis micro and sometimes macro aggressions. 
He was a builder within his institutions.  Steve Bender and Ibrahim 
Gassama can tell you of his work at Oregon; Kevin Johnson, Anupam 
Chander, and Lisa Ikemoto can tell you about Davis. 
He was an innovator who brought the comic book form to law 
reviews.  With Jamie Boyle and Jennifer Jenkins, Keith did a comic 
book on copyright law and fair use which has sold thousands of 
copies and has been downloaded—for free—by more than 500,000 
people worldwide.  Their next book, which Keith was working on 
until his passing, is entitled Theft! A History of Music from Plato to 
Hip Hop and will be coming out soon. 
He was fiercely loyal.  I had the good fortune of being the 
beneficiary of his loyalty when early in my career, another scholar 
critiqued my first article, labeling me a racial fundamentalist for 
making a call for the development of an Asian American 
jurisprudence.  Keith was concerned for two reasons—for my career 
because this person was teaching at a top twenty school while I had 
just started my first tenure track job at a fourth tier school; and for the 
chilling effect it might have on this kind of scholarship.  He organized 
a group of scholars who defended my work in print.  Several years 
later, this would help me with tenure as my tenure committee 
acknowledged the critique of my work but emphasized the strong 
defense of my work by Keith and the group of scholars he organized. 
He helped countless others at various points in their tenure process, 
including people with whom he did not have strong personal 
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connections.  I’m sure part of what motivated him was that he wanted 
to make sure that we got a more fair shake in a game where the deck 
is often stacked against us.  But I think the deeper motivation came 
from his faith in us, the words that we would speak and write, the 
students we would teach, the better world, that with him, we would 
strive to make. 
Sometimes, in this profession, we can forget what the end is.  
James Douglas, the former dean of the Thurgood Marshall School of 
Law at Texas Southern, reminded us of this yesterday when he 
commented following a wonderful panel that remembered and 
explored the late Derrick Bell’s legacy.  Dean Douglas reminded us 
that for his generation of people of color who became law professors, 
becoming a law professor was a means, not an end.  In our profession, 
and especially at this conference, it is easy to become seduced into 
believing that the brass ring is tenure, a job at a more prestigious 
institution, a chaired professorship.  Let us remember, though, what 
the real ends are.  I know that Keith always did. 
He was courageous.  To protest actions taken by the University of 
Oregon, at great personal cost which included uprooting his family’s 
comfortable existence there, he left a chaired professorship at Oregon. 
He was a beloved classroom teacher. 
He was a talented musician and artist. 
It goes on and on.  When invited to give this introduction, I 
hesitated because this is an impossible task.  I can’t, in words, capture 
Keith.  And I realize that that’s what I’m trying to do—I’m trying to 
capture Keith, I need to capture Keith—because I’m trying to hold on 
to him, because I can’t believe that he is gone. 
Keith passed away in April of last year after battling a particularly 
aggressive form of cancer.  He chose to hide his illness from most of 
his friends and colleagues.  For most of us, one moment, he’s 
teaching classes, writing articles, being his usual brilliant, wonderful 
self.  The next moment, he is in the hospital in intensive care, about to 
be released home for hospice care.  Less than a week later, he was 
gone. 
I’ve wondered a lot about his decision to hide his illness.  As I 
mentioned before, one of his wonderful qualities was that he was one 
of those great people whose greatness didn’t fill the room in a way 
that left less space for others.  Instead, he was one of those great 
people who created space for others.  I have to think that that’s part of 
what led him to hide his illness. 
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I can imagine the parade of people—colleagues, students, 
friends—who would have made their way to see him during the 
several months between the initial diagnosis and his passing. 
I was fortunate to have been able to say goodbye to him, to sit with 
him and tell him some stories.  I also find myself haunted by the 
image, Keith lying in the hospital bed in the middle of his living 
room.  The pain in his eyes.  But even with that, he still had his grin. 
Because I can’t capture Keith in words, and maybe I shouldn’t 
have even tried, I’m going to invite folks who knew him to close your 
eyes, to construct a slide show or movie in your heads of your 
encounters with Keith over the years.  Please take a minute to do this. 
If we had more time, I’d invite folks to come up and share their 
stories.  I encourage you, after the program, to share with people at 
your table, your stories, your remembrances of Keith. 
I’m going to share with you snippets from my slide show: 
I met Keith at AALS in Orlando in 1994.  I wasn’t doing well on 
the teaching market, having had only two interviews at the faculty 
recruitment conference, and by January, no callbacks.  Though he had 
just started at Oregon, he offered to help in any way he could. 
The slide show shifts now to the second Asian American Legal 
Theory Workshop in Marin County in 1998.  Keith and Neil Gotanda 
shucking oysters.  Peter Kwan had driven to a nearby oyster farm and 
returned with an ice chest filled with at least a hundred oysters.  
Oysters, cold beer, and Asian American jurisprudence.  Does it get 
any better than this? 
I remember sneaking out with Keith and other junior folks during a 
Western Law Teachers of Color Conference to ride a roller coaster on 
the Santa Cruz boardwalk.  I recall the dirty looks from the senior 
folks when we not so quietly returned to the sessions. 
I see Keith singing “Secret Asian Man” to the tune of Secret Agent 
Man on Lisa Ikemoto’s back patio after a CAPALF conference—
Keith was playing my Martin guitar, banging it up on the arms of the 
Adirondack chair on which he was sitting.  Those scuff marks on my 
guitar used to make me mad whenever I saw them.  Now they bring a 
bittersweet smile. 
The images flash by.  I remember Keith. 
As we come together to remember and honor Keith, I see a 
community bound together by love—Keith was a key part of the love 
that binds us.  Pat Williams, during yesterday’s panel on Derrick 
Bell’s legacy, talked about love.  We don’t talk enough about love.  
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We need to remember and hold onto love, which fosters hope and will 
sustain us as we struggle to make things better in small and big ways. 
There have been commemorations of Keith at Davis, Oregon, at 
the Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty and the 
Northeast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, during the 
Minority Groups Section lunch a couple days ago, and now here. 
They have provided an opportunity for us to say goodbye to him, 
because most of us didn’t get the chance to.  In saying goodbye, we 
are brought together—he has brought us together, once again. 
In one of his last articles, Pictures Within Pictures, in comic book 
form in the Ohio Northern University Law Review, the last frames 
have Keith, flying away on a jetpack, with the words, “You can’t 
avoid the void” on his T-shirt.79  His corporeal body is gone—but he 
is here in all of us.  Share your stories.  Fill the emptiness that his 
passing has left.  Be inspired by Keith Aoki. 
 
79 Keith Aoki, Pictures Within Pictures, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 805, 818 (2010). 
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